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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact that the introduction of the European single market has 
had on the unemployment rates and the level of wages in member countries of the 
European Union. The study seeks to obtain indicators of the labor situation of countries 
that are in the European Union's single market and using the synthetic counterfactuals 
method estimate how the levels of unemployment would have behaved for these 
countries had they not joined the European Union. The study looks at general 
unemployment of the European population. Data used in the study are those obtained 
through the use of claimant count which records those claiming unemployment benefits 
and job seekers allowance and can prove that they are actively looking for work. The 
study will also employ the use of data obtained using the labor force survey method in 
line with the International Labor Organization's criteria of comparing unemployment. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to Economic Integration 
Global economic integration has seen the rise of free trade areas (FTAs) between 
individual countries and the creation of custom unions between countries that would like 
to see the fall in the barriers to trade between them. Economists' claim that the reduction 
in these barriers results in the improvement of the quality of goods and services 
delivered to consumers as a result of competition and that the price benefits of this 
increased competition will trickle down to the consumer. The alternative to this is 
protectionalism which pushes for shielding of a country's domestic industries from 
foreign competition by taxing imports. A high tariff regime was no longer economically 
productive such as happened in Britain which was stuck in an economic depression in 
the early 1840s. In contrast, free trade produced abundance and employment. It was 
appropriate for Britain's economy where a large proportion of the population and 
property depended on commerce and industry alone to hence prefer free trade over 
protectionalism. (Magnus Lodefalk, 2016) 
A free-trade area is the region encompassing a trade bloc whose member countries have 
signed a free-trade agreement (FTA). Such agreements involve cooperation between at 
least two countries to reduce trade barriers such as import quotas and tariffs - and to 
increase trade of goods and services with each other. If people are also free to move 
between the countries, in addition to a free-trade agreement, it would also be considered 
an open border. This is the second stage of economic integration. These FTA's are 
arrangements in which countries give each other preferential treatment in trade, such as 
eliminating tariffs and other barriers on goods. Each country continues its trade policies, 
such as tariffs with count1ies outside theFT A. For example, in the U.S.-Australian FT A 
that took effect in 2005, Australia lowered tariffs on most United States agricultural and 
manufactured goods, and the United States lowered tariffs on Australian beef, dairy and 
other items. (Kym Anderson, Peter Lloyd and Donald MacLaren,2007) 
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A customs union on the other hand is a type of trade bloc which is composed of a free 
trade area with a common external tariff. The participant countries set up common 
external trade policy, but in some cases they use different import quotas. Common 
competition policy is also helpful to avoid competition deficiency. Purposes for 
establishing a customs union nonnally include increasing economic efficiency and 
establishing closer political and cultural ties between the member countries. It is the 
third stage of economic integration. 
Current global attempts at economic integration through formation of free trade 
agreement and custom unions include the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the 
Caribbean Community Regional Integration(CARICOM), Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations(ASEAN), The European Union(EU), The North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership (TPP). 
The European Union's single market is perhaps the most ambitious type of trade co-
operation. This is because as well as eliminating tariffs and taxes on trade, it also 
includes the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. The single market 
strives to remove non-tariff barriers; different rules on packaging, safety and standards 
and many others are abolished and the same rules and regulations apply across the area. 
But to stay in the single market, countries have to allow the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and people. This also means that immigration is very hard to control. 
Membership of the single market also normally involves making annual payments 
towards the EU's budget and accepting the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. 
Implementation of Single Market liberalisation measures is proceeding well. Without a 
doubt, the elimination of frontier controls and delays, the free circulation of capital and 
the liberalisation of financial services have been widely and wannly welcomed by 
economic operators. However, implementation of a certain number of measures has 
encountered problems. 
Given the nature of Single Market measures, their implementation has resulted in 
essentially microeconomic effects and modifications to the structure of production and 
trade inside the EU. As a consequence, the analysis focuses on identifying and 
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measuring microeconomic phenomena. Nevertheless, an attempt is also made to 
evaluate the macroeconomic impact on income and employment 
1.2 The European Union Single Market 
The European Union (EU) is a political and economic union of 28-member states that 
are located in Europe. It has an area of 4,475,757 km2 and an estimated population of 
over 51 0 million. The EU has developed an internal single market through a 
standardized system of laws that apply in all member states. EU policies aim to ensure 
the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital within the internal market, 
enact legislation in justice and home affairs, and maintain common policies on trade, 
agriculture, fisheries, and regional development. A monetary union was established in 
1999 and came into full force in 2002, and is composed of 19-EU member states which 
use the euro currency. 
The EU operates through a hybrid system of supranational and intergovernmental 
decision-making. A supranational union is a type of multinational political union where 
negotiated power is delegated to an authority by governments of member states. The 
concept of supranational union is sometimes used to describe the European Union (EU), 
as a new type of political entity (Kiljunen, 2004). The seven principal decision-making 
bodies known as the institutions of the European Union are the European Council, the 
Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, and the European 
Conmlission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, 
and the European Court of Auditors. 
The EU traces its migins from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the 
European Economic Community (EEC), formed by the Inner Six countries in 1951 and 
1958, respectively. The community and its successors have grown in size by the 
accession of new member states and in power by the addition of policy areas to its remit. 
The Maastricht Treaty established the European Uruon in 1993 and introduced European 
citizensllip. The latest major amendment to the constitutional basis of the EU, the Treaty 
of Lisbon, came into force in 2009. (Vincent Aussilloux, Agnes Benassy-Quere, 
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Clemens Fuest, 2017).The EU single market involves integration between nations and is 
built upon four key freedoms: 
1. Free Trade in Goods: Businesses can sell their products anywhere in the EU's 
member states and consumers can buy where they want with no penalty. Intra-
EU trade of goods represents 75% of intra-EU trade flows. For countries such as 
the Czech Republic and Hungary, trade with the EU accounts for over 90% of 
their trade, showing how important the single market is to their economic 
fortunes (Eurostat, 2017). 
•11. Mobility of Labor: Citizens of EU member states can live, study and work in 
any other country. The aim is to improve the mobility of labour. Every year over 
180,000 European students move to another member state for the Erasmus 
Programme or to attend a post-graduate degree. But overall, Europe is an area of 
low mobility with only 2% of Europeans living in a Member State different from 
that of their nationality. This figure is three times higher in the United States. An 
.. estimated 12 million European citizeri live in an EU country other than their own 
111. Free Movement of Capital: Currencies and capital can flow freely between 
member states and EU citizens can use fmancial services in any member state 
w . ·Free Trade in Services: Professional services such as pensions, architecture, 
telecoms and advertising can be offered in any member state. Services accomit 
for over 70% of GDP in many EU countries. But progress in expanding intra-EU 
· trade in services has been slow. At present, only 20% of the services provided in · 
the EU have a cross-border dimension (Kemekliene et al., 2007). 
The EU Single Market is designed to create a positive sum game for member states if 
h·ade and competition leads to higher productivity and brings about lower costs for 
producers and eventually cheaper prices for consumers. A positive sum game refers to 
the outcome of a decision or a policy or a negotiation involving at least one agent 
benefiting. Stronger competition encourages industrial restructuring because exposure to 
other markets causes businesses to re-organize their management so as to minimize costs 
(Papulova, & Papulova, 2006). 
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Lower pnces should boost consumers' real living standards and an increase in 
competition will lead to improved allocation efficiency and less waste. This might mean 
for example lower fares for airlines, cheaper prices for mobile calls or reduced costs for 
car and home insurance if European markets are more contestable. 
Firms selling in the Single Market have unrestricted access to over 500 million 
consumers in The European Union. The size of market allows businesses to exploit 
economies of scale leading to improvements in productive efficiency. For example UK 
retailers such as Tesco have successfully made in-roads into the retail markets of many 
EU countries earning profits that flow back into the UK. Foreign retailers have entered 
UK as a result too.In short the single market is designed to accelerate the gains from 
specialization and trade benveen participatmg nations. 
1.2.1 Intra-European Trade 
The EU is a customs union with a common market. This means that the EU levies duties 
on imported goods and services. But there is free trade within the market. This causes a 
rise in intra-EU trade. A recent EU report found that Intra-European trade currently 
accounts for 17% and 28% of world trade in goods and services respectively. 
Taking services separately, over 30% of intra-European trade in services is in the travel 
industry, followed by transport at about 20% and insurance and finance at about 10%. 
Health care remains largely within natiomil borders. There has been some increase in the 
demand for and willingness to pay for health tourism services especially treatments that 
are cheap in Eastern Europe but little investment by multinational health care businesses 
in different EU countries(Eurohealth, 2013). 
1.3 Motivation 
What is the contribution of customs unions to the labour situation of individual 
member countries? 
During the formation of the European Union the expectation was that the single market 
would result in driving the member states to prosperity. The EU single market is 
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presented as a territory with no internal border regulatory obstacles to the movement of 
people, goods, services and capital. The results of this were to improve quality of goods 
and services; and improve employment for maximum economic benefit to member 
states. 
This situation has however remained a myth of the European single market freedoms. 
(Single Market Observatory, 2012) This can be seen as recently as the United 
Kingdom's referendum of 2016 on BREXIT that saw Britain opt to leave the European 
Union. The decision to leave the single market; BREXIT, is expected to push 
joblessness significantly higher with institutions like the IMF and the Bank of England 
predicting that the United Kingdom unemployment will shoot up as a result of the vote 
to leave. (Bank of England Credit Suisse, 2016) 
Which begs the question; has European Union single market membership been of 
benefit to the citizens' employment rates? 
A narrative used by the proponents of the leaving single market in Britain's 2016 
BREXIT referendum or not was that the mobility of labour had seen jobs go to 
foreigners and hence a United Kingdom that was outside the European Union would 
lead to better employment for native citizens. To leave campaigner Boris Johnson has 
dismissed as a "hoax" claims by the Treasury that 800,000 people would lose their jobs 
and that Britain would be plunged into a year-long recession following a vote to leave 
the EU in June 2016.This narrative has also been recently taken up in the United States 
of America with claims that NAFT A and TPP would take employment away from the 
US. The East African Community has also seen its intentions for the creation of a fully 
single market being met with resistance from individual states that have the perception 
that the single market will help citizens of more developed states in the union and do 
nothing to lower unemployment in the less developed countries party to the community . . 
Therefore, on this basis, this study seeks to investigate the impact of the European single 
market economy on the employment situation in European Union member states. 
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1.4 General Objectives 
The general objective of this study is to investigate the impact that the introduction of 
the European single market has had on the rates of employment among the union's 
member countries. 
1.4.1 Specific objectives 
Objectives of this study are to: 
To determine the contribution ofEuropean single market to the labour 
situation of individual member countries. 
• To investigate whether membership in the EU has generated any 
benefits to the individual member states in terms of better wages. 
1.4.2 Research Questions 
• What is the contribution of European single market to the labour situation 
of individual member countries? 
• What would have been the current levels of unemployment in these 
countries had they not become members of the European single market? . 
• Is there any significance in the change in level of wages for countries 
since joining the EU single market? 
• How would these countries labour situation have been had the countries 
not joined the single market? 
1.5 Justification 
The findings from this study will provide a framework from which countries that have 
joined free trade areas, custom unions and common markets or intend to can draw upon 
a reference on how their employment rates will be impacted by their membership. 
These findings can be used as precedent by the African Union, East African Union, 
ASEAN and others as they seek to create an economic block that has a complete single 
market between its member countries within their zones in order to provide empirical 
evidence as to the effects of membership to employment. 
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1.6 Scope of the Study 
The study is to investigate the impact of the European single market on unemployment 
rate among the selected union member countries. The focus will be on the level of total 
unemployment in the country under observation. Statistical inference permits us to draw 
conclusions about a population based on a sample. The sample countries selected to be of 
focus will be the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Denmark. This is because they have consistent data about 
unemployment and average level ofwages. 
1. 7 Assumptions to the study 
All relevant data will be available and accurate. That the European Union has complete 
data bases and accurate data collection for best representation of the actual situation is 
taken as given by the data from the selection of data sources. 
The nine selected countries will represent a general similar trend of the effects as are 
being felt in other countries that are members to the European Union single market. 
The synthetic control generated by the method of synthetic counterfactuals (Abadie et al. 
(2010, 2012)) presents the best representation ofwhat the rate of unemployment would 
have been now in the event that the country had not joined the European Union single 
market. 
1.8 Limitations to the study 
The researcher will not reach the target population for data collection due to the nature 
of geographical diversity of European Union countries which will be costly in terms of 
time and money therefore the researcher will depend on secondary data already captured 
based on unemployment situation. Journals, magazines, previous, researchers on the 
same topic will also provide data. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The Economic recovery after World War 2 was quick in Europe and by the early 1950s, 
most European countries had per capita GDP that were equal or above their pre-war 
levels (Crafts and Toniolo, 2008). This recovery was followed by a period known as the 
Golden Age of European growth (Temin 2002) between 1950 and 1973 whereby both 
Western and Eastern Europe grew at unprecedented rates (Eichengreen, 2007). 
Economic and political integration are prominent among the various explanations, which 
emphasized that the rapid and comprehensive policy of trade liberalization generated 
growth payoffs in the context of European Free Trade Association (EFTA). These 
eventually led to the formation of the European Union single market that had four pillars 
among them the free movement of people across the Schengen area. Economists said 
that this would result in better employment and wages in the region within the single 
market. 
2.2 Theoretical Review 
A large number of policy makers believe that labor mobility offers a solution to reach 
full employment in the Union. When the European Union was created, the purpose was 
to create an optimum currency area (OCA), whose characteristics were: 
1. Labour mobility across area's regions (Mundell, 1961), 
u . Openness with capital mobility and price and wage flexibility across the region 
(Me Kinnon, 1963) 
111. Production diversification (Kenen, 1969). In theory, 
tv. Labour mobility within the OCA. This was to enable European workers to move 
from a country to another in order to reduce unemployment in countries where 
high unemployment rates prevail, and offer a new labour force where there is a 
lack of workers. 
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Neoclassical economics views inequalities in the distribution of income as arising from 
differences in value added by labor, capital and land. Within labor income distribution is 
due to differences in value added by different classifications of workers. In this 
perspective, wages and profits are determined by the marginal value added of each 
economic actor. We can hence say that in a market economy, inequality is a reflection of 
the productivity gap between the highly-paid professions and the lower-paid professions. 
Marxian. economics attributes 1ising inequality to job automation and capital deepening 
within .capitalism. The process of job automation conflicts with the capitalist property 
form and its attendant system of wage labor. In Marxian analysis, capitalist firms 
increasingly substitute capital equipment for labor inputs under competitive pressure to 
reduce costs and maximize profits. Over the long-tenn, this trend increases the organic 
·composition of capital, meaning that fewer workers are required in proportion to capital 
inputs, increasing unemployment. This process exerts a downward pressure on wages. 
The substitution of capital equipment for labor raises the productivity of each worker, . 
resulting in a situation of r-elatively stagnant wages for the working class amidst rising 
levels of property income for the capitalist class. 
The· best~known theory of international migration is the neoclassic one (macro and 
micro),. which was originally developed to explain labour migration in the process of 
development (Ranis & Fei, 1961; Harris & Todaro, 1970). One of the main arguments 
for. labour migration in the economic literature is the wage difference between the 
sending and the host country; the probability to migrate being positively conelated to the 
wage difference (Heinz & Ward-Warmedinger, 2006). However, the robustness of this 
determiner is not undeniable. A study carried out by the United Nations concludes that 
migrations provoked by wage differences are low. Moreover, it is not obvious which 
wage measure seems the most relevant to measure worker's incentive to migrate. 
Another factor of labour mobility is the expected growth rate of real GDP per capita, 
since it relates the expected path of income and of the real convergence in the standards 
of living between the "old" and the "new" European Union's countries. A high level of 
unemployment in the sending country in comparison to the host country constitutes 
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another incentive to migrate, and this effect is stronger for the unskilled workers. Mazier 
et al. (2002) explain that employment prospects _are fundamental to a migrant whether he 
wants to migrate or not. 
The economic literature of migration suggests that the youngest workers are the most 
mobile. Brucker et al. (2003) point out that 70% of workers living in West-Europe 
(Native of the CEEC) are between 25 and 44 years old. International trade will affect the 
extent and the speed of income and wages convergence, and therefore, the potential flow 
of migrants. Substantially increased international trade should accelerate the real 
convergence of the new EU members to the old ones, and may dampen the labour 
migration effect. 
Historically, the European construction · was based on · a will to encourage labour 
mobility. Several treaties and agreements content articies on labour mobility, like the 
treaty of Rome (1958), the Schengert ·a.greement (1985), the Maastricht treaty (1992) or 
the treaty of Amsterdam (1997). 
However, it is well known that labour mobility in Europe is weak, and does not allow a .. 
balancing between European countries (Heinz & Ward-Warmedinger, 2006). So, in 
order to encourage European workers to move -to other countries, some measures were 
needed to be taken. One of them was to continue trade liberalization between the old and 
the new European Union's members. The new European Union members are countri-es 
that adhered to the Union by May 2004 and January 2007. 
2.3 Empirical Review 
2.3.1 Labor migration in the European Union 
The argument is that there is a relationship between labour mobility and trade. Yet, 
economists are divided about this relat~onship. If the relationship between labour 
mobility and trade is positive which is to say they are complements, trade liberalization 
should be maintained and reinforced in order to favour labour mobility. But if the 
Telationship between trade and labour mobility negative, to say that they are substitutes, 
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European policy makers should contract trade volume to incite workers to move. The 
aforementioned agreements concern all types of migrations. 
Labour migration is made of four different flows: migrants who are looking for a job; 
foreigners that, after a status change, are looking for a job; people who were admitted for 
no economic motive but having the right to work eventually begin looking for a job; and 
seasonal workers 
There is no single, coherent theory of international migration, only a fragmented set of 
theories that have developed largely in isolation from one another, sometimes but not 
always segmented by disciplinary boundaries. The best-known theory of international 
migration is the neoclassic one, which was originally developed to explain labour 
migration iri the process of development [Lewis (1954), Ranis & Fei (1961), Harris & 
Todaro (1970), Todaro (1976)]. 
One of the main_ arguments for labour migration' in the economic literature is the wage 
difference between the sending and the host country with the probability to migrate 
being positively correlated to the wage difference (Heinz & Ward-Warmedinger, 2006). 
However, the robustness of this determiner is not undeniable. A study carried out by the 
United, Nations concludes that migrations provoked by wage differences are low. It is 
also not obvious which wage measure seems the most relevant to measure worker's 
incentive to migrate.( Massey & al. (1993), p 433 UN (1997), World population 
monitoring, New York.) 
There are two main points of view concernirig the relationship between labour mobility 
and trade. While some economists believe that labour mobility is a substitute to trade, as 
shown by Mundell (1957), others believe that trade and labour mobility are 
complements, as shown by Markusen (1983). In one hand, Mundell presented his model 
under a Heckscher-Ohlin framework and demonstrated that trade and factor mobility are 
substitutes. This point of view is widely acknowledged in the European Union. For 
instance, Straubhaar (2001) wrote that to an important degree, trade has replaced the 
economic demand for migration in the EU. On the other hand, Markusen showed that 
labour mobility and trade are complements. He exposed fust the assumptions of the 
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Heckscher-Ohlin model and explained that if we consider different factor endowments, 
trade and labour mobility are substitutes. But if the other assumptions such as that 
countries have identical technologies, production is characterized by constant returns to 
scale, production is characterized by perfect competition and . there are no domestic 
distortions in either countries are relaxed while the countries have identical factor 
endowments, then labour mobility and trade are complements. This point of view seems 
neglected in Europe. However, Collins & al. (1997) shaded Mundell and Markusen's 
conclusions by using series going back until the 1870s, these authors cannot confirm 
substitutability between labour mobility and trade, neither a complementarity. The 
nature of the relationship between trade and labour mobility has important implications 
in terms of economic policy. If trade and labour mobility are substitutes, trade should be 
restricted in the union in order to stimulate labour mobility. If they are complements, 
trade levels should be raised to stimulate labour mobility. All these explanations of 
labour mobility constitute what migration theories call push and pull factors. The push 
factors, or supply side factors, affect the incentive to migrate. The pull factors, . or 
demand side factors, affect the demand for immigrants in the destination country. For 
instance, if there is a high gap between two countries unemployment rates, this gap 
constitutes a push factor. The case of German reunification clearly illustrates Push 
motivated migration (Delisle, 2002). The economic and opportunity costs of migration 
were low, the opportunity costs even lower, with the massive unemployment that arose 
in the former Eastern Germany just after reunification. This resulted in a massive and 
very fast flow of migration westward, amounting up to 7% of the German population 
over 10 years, and 2.8% during the first 6 months. 
Distance is considered as a cost by the economic theory. This cost is positively 
correlated with distance so that distance and labour mobility are negatively correlated 
[Clark (1986), Crozet (2004)]. However, we will show that they are positively 
correlated. Last but not least, network effects have a strong effect on labour mobility. 
The number of migrants of the same nationality in a host country significantly decreases 
the monetary, social and psychological costs to migration and the risk of migration for 
potential migrants For instance, network effects suggest that Germany and Austria could 
expect to receive a large share of immigration from the CEEC due to their relatively 
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high population of foreign nationals from these countries, and that Poland may be the 
key source of migrants. The networks were identified as a form of social capital [Massey 
& al. (1987), after [Massey (2001)], referred to networks as the sum of resources, actual 
or virtual, that accrue to an individual or group by virtue of possessing a durable 
network or more less institutionalized relationship of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition[Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992), after Massey (2001)]. The networks are on 
one hand results of migration and a propeller of migration on the others. Empirical 
evidence suggests that migrants often rely on assistance of relatives or countrymen, 
while establishing a new life at the destination country (Zlotnik, 1998). Mouhoud & 
Oudinet (2004) show that labour mobility in Europe is only due to network effects, and 
fhat the aforementioned economic variables do not explain labor mobility. 
2.3.2 Labor market policy framework 
Labor market institutions are deemed to have a great influence on the level and structure 
of 
Employment through management of the number and the type and quality of jobs 
available. This holds for institutional features such as the regulation of employment 
protection through use of dismissal protection, fixed-term contracts, minimum wages, 
the tax/benefit system as well as active labour market policies (ALMP). This is why 
policy makers implement labour market reforms in order to stimulate job creation. The 
hope linked to labour market reforms is a sustainable reduction of structural and cyclical 
unemployment 
This sub-section reviews major approaches and findings on the evaluation of the impact 
of different labour market institutions but pays particular attention to active labour 
market policies that play an important role in the portfolio of economic policy makers in 
many OECD countries for several decades. Most notably, in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession there was renewed interest in the potential for active labour market policies 
(ALMP's) to help ease a wide range of labour market problems, including youth 
unemployment and persistent joblessness among displaced adults. But do active labour 
market policy interventions deliver? Rigorous evaluation in this field has grown rapidly 
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since the early 2000s so that we can now rely on a huge body of evidence across 
countries, programmes, subgroups of participants and time horizons. 
Since about two decades labor market institutions have received increasing attention as 
means to explain long-lasting differences in the employment performance between 
developed countries, most notably the persistence in divergence of employment and 
unemployment rates. Institutions are seen as mechanisms that influence the speed and 
scope of adjustment to economic shocks with institutions translating economic 
fluctuations into employment responses through more or less flexibility of wages (see 
Eichhorst, Feil and Braun 2008). Influential studies such as Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman(1991), Nickell (1997),Blanchard and Wolfers(2000), and, most important, the 
OECD Jobs Study (1994) have aimed at establishing links between employment and 
unemployment rates and structures and institutional arrangements. Core institutions 
addressed include the wage setting system as regards bargaining coverage and 
centralization, the generosity of unemployment benefits, spending on active labour 
market policies, the taxes and contributions raised on labor and, last but not 1 east, the 
regulation of the labor market via employment protection. 
The general argument made was that over protective labor market institutions distort the 
functioning of price and wage setting mechanisms, thereby leading to higher 
unemployment and a delayed adaptation after economic shocks. While generous 
unemployment benefits and high union density were argued to be associated with higher 
unemployment, the role of active labour market policy spending and bargaining 
coordination were identified as factors contributing positively to a decline in 
unemployment. The effect of employment protection was perceived as more ambiguous. 
Despite the strong influence of these contributions on the broader discourse about labour 
market institutions and reforms, also promoted through the OECD Jobs Strategy, the 
evidence presented received some criticism, in particular referring as regards the 
robustness of some findings.(Baccaro and Rei 2007) Since these early studies on 
institutions and employment performance, improved indicators representing country-
level institutions have been developed which allow for a more fine-grained picture of 
national institutional arrangements. In addition, more countries and years will be 
included in later studies, thereby mitigating the problem of a very limited number of 
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observations. Furthermore, in response to the notable difference in employment 
performance observed and analyzed over the 1990s, most labour markets in Europe 
underwent major reforms over the last decades, mostly intended to stimulate additional 
job creation and limit benefit dependency. Typical reform elements are increased wage 
flexibility facilitated by declining and more decentralized bargaining, a partial change of 
employment protection legislation in countries with relatively strict dismissal protection 
leading to more deregulated segment of so called non-standard types of employment 
such as fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work and stronger efforts to make 
benefit receipt fonnally and in practice more conditional upon participation in active 
labour market measures and effective job search efforts. Both academics and policy 
makers have developed a strong interest in evaluating the specific and combined impacts 
of such reforms on labour market performance. With respect to this a highly influential 
and comprehensive assessment of employment performance related to institutional 
determinants was presented by Bassanini and Duval in 2006 in the context of the 
reassessment of the OECD Jobs Strategy.( Bassanini and Duval (2006)) They use new 
indicators, different lengths of time series and alternative specifications for their 
reassessment of the role of policies and institutions in explaining employment and 
unemployment patterns in developed countries. 
Their work also takes up the criticism of lacking robustness in estimations. Their checks 
include different choices of the estimation samples, alternative model specifications and 
estimation techniques. Regarding their regressions on the institutional determinants of 
unemployment in a panel of21 OECD countries over the years from 1982 to 2003, they 
find a positive effect of generous unemployment benefits, a large tax wedge and strict 
product market regulation on unemployment while bargaining centralization or 
coordination tends to lower unemployment. 
This basically mirrors the fmdings of earlier studies. These factors also influence the 
specific employment rates of particular groups that tend to exhibit a lower employment 
level if not supported by suitable institutions. Bassanini and Duval also stress the 
particular importance of interactions between institutions and reforms in explaining 
employment performance. With respect to the core set of labour market institution, they 
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use the a set of institutional indicators , many of them developed by that can now be 
considered a widely used standard, including the unemployment benefit replacement 
rates for different types of workers, the labour-tax wedge and marginal tax rates for 
specific groups, the OECD summary indicator for employment protection legislation, an 
aggregate indicator on collective bargaining and public expenditures on active labour 
market policies. Despite these achievements, however, still a large extent to abstraction 
from specific sub-national variations is required in order to allow for cross-country 
comparisons. Over the last year empirical investigations focused for example on the role 
employment protection outside national legislation such as the de facto enforcement of 
dismissal protection by court rulings, specific provisions laid down in collective -
bargaining and particular exemptions (Venn 2009) , thereby complementing the 
information from the widely used OECD employment protection legislation indicator . . 
Still comprehensive country coverage and time series data continue to rely on the 
legislative information only. The same holds for most recent attempts at measuring 
formal national availability criteria as a way to link unemployment benefit generosity to 
the implementation of activation policies that cannot easily be identified through 
spending on active labour market policies.{Venn 2012 and Langenbucher, 2015) . 
Furthermore, complementing these broad comparative studies a large bulk of literature 
has emerged around particular areas of institutional elements. This can be illustrated by 
the example of employmen.t protection legislation. The deregulation of employment 
protection focusing on a more liberal access to fixed term contracts has changed the 
functioning of labour markets as different types of contracts have become available to 
both employers and employees or jobseekers. The empirical question that has attracted 
most attention both by policy makers and by researchers is to what extent the 
deregulation of temporary employment has created additional opportunities to enter the 
labor market and to move to permanent positions after an initial fixed Term contract 
compared to a situation without or with more restrictive temporary employment options. 
Adyocates of fixed term employment opportunities ~end to stress the need to increase the 
flexibility of the labor market in order to facilitate the creation of additional jobs as well 
as the stepping stone character of these jobs, particularly for young people and other 
labor market entrants. In contrast, critics would argue that fixed term contracts run the 
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risk of protracted sequences of precarious employment without a realistic chance of 
promotion, but putting pressure on the quality of jobs even in other segments of the 
labour market (Eichhorst, 2014) 
2.3.3 Economic disparity 
Economists generally consider three metrics of economic dispersion: wealth, income, 
and consumption. A skilled professional may have low wealth and low income as 
student, low wealth and high earnings in the beginning of the career, and high wealth 
and low earnings after the career. People's preferences determine whether they consume 
earnings immediately or defer consumption to the future. The distinction is also 
important at the level of economy: 
i . There are economies with high mcome inequality and relatively low wealth 
inequality such as Japan and Italy. 
u. There are economies with relatively low mcome inequality and high wealth 
inequality such as Switzerland and Denmark 
There are different ways to measure income inequality and wealth inequality. Different 
choices lead to different results. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) provides data on the following eight types of income inequality: 
i . Dispersion of hourly wages among full-time workers 
u. Wage dispersion among workers such as through annual wages, including wages 
from part-time work or work during only part of the year. 
m. Individual earmngs inequality among all workers. This includes the self-
employed. 
1v. Individual earnmgs inequality among the entire working-age population. 
Includes those who are inactive such as students, unemployed and early 
pensiOners. 
v. Household earmngs inequality which includes the earnmgs of all household 
members. 
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vi. Household market income inequality that include incomes from capital, savings 
and private transfers. 
vii. Household disposable mcome inequality that includes public cash transfers 
received and direct taxes paid. 
v n1. Household adjusted disposable mcome inequality which includes publicly 
provided services. 
There are many challenges m comparmg data between econonnes or m a single 
economy in different years. Examples of challenges include: 
1. Data can be based on joint taxation of couples as is the case in France, Germany, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland or individual taxation as is the 
case in Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, the UK 
11. The tax authorities generally only collect information on income that 1s 
potentially taxable. 
111. The precise definition of gross income varies from country to country. There are 
differences when it comes to inclusion of pension entitlements and other savings, 
and benefits such as employer provided health insurance. 
iv. Differences when it comes under-declaration of income and/or wealth in tax 
filings. 
v. A special event like an exit from business may lead to a very high income in one 
year, but much lower income in other years of the person's lifetime. 
v1. Much income and wealth in non-western countries is obtained or held extra-
legally through black market and underground activities such as unregistered 
businesses, informal property ownership arrangements. 
A 2011 study called "Divided we Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising" by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) investigated 
economic inequality in OECD countries, including the number of factors. Changes in the 
structure of households can play an important role. Single-headed households in OECD 
countries have risen from an average of 15% in the late 1980s to 20% in the rnid-2000s, 
resulting in higher inequality. Assortative mating refers to the phenomenon of people 
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marrying people with similar b~ckground, for example doctors marrying doctors rather 
than nurses. OECD found out that 40% of couples where both partners work belonged to 
the same or neighboring earnings deciles compared with 33% some 20 years before. In 
the bottom percentiles number of hours worked has decreased. The main reason for 
increasing inequality seems to be the difference between the demand for and supply of 
skills. Income inequality in OECD countries is at its highest level for the past half 
century. The ratio between the bottom 10% and the top 10% has increased from 1 :7, to 
1:9 in 25 years. There are tentative signs of a possible convergence of inequality levels 
towards a common and higher average level across OECD countries. With very few 
exceptions of France, Japan, and Spain, the wages of the 10% best-paid workers have 
risen relative to those of the 10% lowest paid. 
A 2011 OECD study investigated economic inequality in Argentina, Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. It concluded that key sources of inequality in 
these countries included a large, persistent informal sector, widespread regional divides 
between urban and rural, gaps in access to education and barriers to employment and 
career progression for women. 
Researchers claim that global income inequality is decreasing, due to strong economic 
growth in developing countries. However, the OECD reported in 20 15 that income 
inequality is higher than it has ever been within OECD member nations and is at 
increased levels in many emerging economies. According to a June 2015 report by the 
Fund: Widening income inequality is the defining challenge of our time. In advanced 
economies, the gap between the rich and poor is at its highest level in decades. 
Inequality trends have been more mixed in emerging markets and developing countries 
(EMDCs), with some countries experiencing declining inequality, but pervasive 
inequities in access to education, health care, and finance remain. 
2.3.4 Causes of Economic disparity 
There are various reasons for economic inequality within societies. Recent growth in 
overall income inequality, at least within the OECD countries, has been driven mostly 
by increasing inequality in wages and salaries. Economist Thomas Piketty argues that 
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widening economic disparity is an inevitable phenomenon of free market capitalism 
when the rate of return of capital is greater than the rate of growth of the economy. 
Common factors thought to impact economic inequality include: 
1. Labor market outcomes 
11. Globalization. This was through: 
a) Suppressing wages in low-skill jobs due to a surplus of low-skill labor m 
developing countries. 
b) Increasing the market size and the rewards for people and firms succeeding in a 
particular niche. 
c) Providing more investment opportunities for already-wealthy people. 
d) Increasing international influence. 
e) Decreasing domestic influence. 
111. Policy reforms 
iv. Extra-legal ownership ofproperty. 
v. More regressive taxation computerization, automation and increased technology, 
which means more skills are required to obtain a moderate or high wage 
v1. ethnic discrimination 
v11. gender discrimination 
vm. nepotism 
ix. variation in natural ability 
x. nee-liberalism 
x1. Growing acceptance of very high CEO salaries, e.g. in the United States since the 
1960s. 
xii . Land speculation - Followers of Henry George believe that landlords and land 
speculators derive excess wealth and income from the tendency of land to increase 
exponentially with development and at a much higher rate than population growth. 
Their solution is to tax land value, though not necessarily structures or other 
improvements. 
A major cause of econormc inequality within modem market econormes IS the 
determination of wages by the market. Where competition is imperfect; information 
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unevenly distributed; opportunities to acqurre education and skills unequal market 
failure results. Since many such imperfect conditions exist in virtually every market, 
there is in fact little presumption that markets are in general efficient. This means that 
there is an enormous potential role for government to correct such market failures. In a 
purely capitalist mode of production where professional and labor organizations cannot 
limit the number of workers the workers' wages will not be controlled by these 
organizations, or by the employer, but rather by the market. Wages work in the same 
way as prices for any other good. Thus, wages can be considered as a function of market 
price of skill. And therefore, inequality is driven by this price. Under the law of supply 
and demand, the price of skill is determined by a race between the demand for the 
skilled worker and the supply of the skilled worker. " 
On the other hand, markets can also concentrate wealth; pass environmental costs on to 
society, and abuse workers and consumers. Markets, by themselves, even when they are 
stable, often lead to hjgh levels of inequality, outcomes that are widely viewed as unfair. 
Employers who offer a below market wage will fmd that their business is chronically 
understaffed. Their competitors will take advantage of the situation by offering a higher 
wage the best of their labor. For a businessman who has the profit motive as the prime 
interest, it is a losing proposition to offer below or above market wages to workers. 
A job where there are many workers willing to work a large amount of time competing 
for a job that few require will result in a low wage for that job. This is because 
competition between workers drives down the wage. An example of this would be jobs 
such as dish-washing or customer service. Competition amongst workers tends to drive 
down wages due to the expendable nature of the worker in relation to his or her 
particular job. A job where there are few able or willing workers, but a large need for the 
positions will result in high wages for that job. This is because competition between 
employers for employees will drive up the wage. Examples of this would include jobs 
that require highly developed skills, rare abilities, or a high level of risk. Competition 
amongst employers tends to drive up wages due to the nature of the job, since there is a 
relative shortage of workers for the particular position. Professional and labor 
organizations may limit the supply of workers which results in higher demand and 
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greater mcomes for members. Members may also receive higher wages through 
collective bargaining, political influence, or corruption. 
These supply and demand interactions result in a gradation of wage levels within society 
that significantly influence economic inequality. Polarization of wages does not explain 
the accumulation of wealth and very high incomes among the top income percentage of 
society. Joseph Stiglitz believes that it is plain that markets must be tamed and tempered 
to make sure they work to the benefit of most citizens. 
On the other hand, higher economic inequality tends to increase entrepreneurship rates at 
the individual level through self-employment. Most of this of this is often based 
however on necessity rather than opportunity. Necessity-based entrepreneurship . is 
motivated by survival needs such as income for food and shelter whereas opportunity-
based entrepreneurship is driven by achievement-oriented motivations such as vocation 
and more likely to involve the pursuit of new products, services, or underserved market 
needs. The economic impact of the former type of entrepreneurialism tends to be 
redistributive while the latter is expected to foster technological progress and thus have a 
more positive impact on economic growth. 
An important factor in the creation of inequality is variation in an individuals' access to 
education. Education, especially in an area where there is a high demand for workers, 
creates high wages for those with this education, however, increases in education first 
increase and then decrease growth as well as income inequality. As a result, those who 
are unable to afford an education, or choose not to pursue optional education, generally 
receive much lower wages. The justification for this is that a lack of education leads 
directly to lower incomes, and thus lower aggregate savings and investment. Conversely, 
education raises incomes and promotes growth because it helps to unleash the 
productive potential of the poor. 
During the mass high school education movement from 1910---40, there was an increase 
in skilled workers, which led to a decrease in the price of skilled labor. High school 
education during the period was designed to equip students with necessary skill sets to 
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be able to perform at work. In fact, it differs from the present high school education, 
which is regarded as a stepping-stone to acquire college and advanced degrees. This 
decrease in wages caused a period of compression and decreased inequality between 
skilled and unskilled workers. Education is very important for the growth of the 
economy; however educational inequality in gender also influence towards the economy. 
Lagerlof and Galor stated that gender inequality in education can result to slow 
economic growth, and continued gender inequality in education, thus creating a poverty 
trap. It is suggested that a large gap in male and female education may indicate 
backwardness and so may be associated with lower economic growth, which can explain 
why there is economic inequality between countries. 
More studies also fmd that female secondary education is positively associated with 
growth. His findings show that in countries with low female education; increasing it has 
little effect on economic growth; however in countries with high female education, 
increasing it significantly boosts economic growth. More and better education is a 
prerequisite for rapid economic development around the world. Education stimulates 
economic growth and improves people's lives through many channels. 
By increasing the efficiency of the labour force; it creates better conditions for good 
governance, improving health and enhancing equality. Labor market success is linked to 
schooling achievement, the consequences of widening disparities in schooling is likely 
to be further increases in earnings inequality. 
2.2.5 Economic liberalism, regulation and trade unions 
John Schmitt and Ben Zipperer, (2006) of the CEPR point to economic liberalism and 
the reduction of business regulation along with the decline of union membership as the 
causes of economic inequality. In an analysis of the effects of intensive Anglo-American 
liberal policies in comparison to continental European liberalism, where unions have 
remained strong, they concluded that the U.S. economic and social model is associated 
with substantial levels of social exclusion, including high levels of income inequality, 
high relative and absolute poverty rates, poor and unequal educational outcomes, poor 
health outcomes, and high rates of crime and incarceration. At the same time, the 
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available evidence provides little support for the VIew that U.S.-style labor market 
flexibility dramatically improves labor-market outcomes. Despite popular prejudices to 
the contrary, the U.S. economy consistently affords a lower level of economic mobility 
than all the continental European countries for which data is available." 
Sociologist Jake Rosenfield of the University of Washington asserts that the decline of 
organized labor in the United States has played a more significant role in expanding the 
income gap than technological changes and globalization, which were also experienced 
by other industrialized nations that didn't experience steep surges in inequality. He 
points out that nations with high rates of unionization, particularly in Scandinavia, have 
very low levels of inequality, and concludes "the historical pattern is clear; the cross-
national pattern is clear: high inequality goes hand-in-hand with weak labor movements 
and vice-versa." 
A 2015 study by the International Monetary Fund found that the decline of unionization 
in many advanced economies starting in the 1980s has fueled rising income inequality. 
In 2016, researchers at the IMF concluded that neoliberal policies imposed by economic 
. elites have exacerbated inequality to such an extent that it is slowing economic growth 
and jeopardizing durable expansion. Their report highlights that: 
i . The benefits in terms of increased growth seem fairly difficult to establish when 
looking at a broad group of countries. 
11. The costs in tenns of increased inequality are prominent. Such costs epitomize the 
trade-off between the growth and equity effects of some aspects of the neoliberal 
agenda. 
iii. Increased inequality in turn hurts the level and sustainability of growth. Even if 
growth is the sole or main purpose of the neoliberal agenda, advocates of that agenda 
still need to pay attention to the distributional effects. 
2.3.6 Trade Liberalisation 
Trade liberalization may shift economic inequality from a global to a domestic scale. 
When rich countries trade with poor countries, the low-skilled workers in the rich 
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countries may see reduced wages as a result of the competition, while low-skilled 
workers in the poor countries may see increased wages. Trade economist Paul Krugman 
estimates that trade liberalisation has had a measurable effect on the rising inequality in 
the United States. He attributes this trend to increased trade with poor countries and the 
fragmentation of the means of production, resulting in low skilled jobs becoming more 
tradeable .. However, he concedes that the effect of trade on inequality in America is 
minor when compared to other causes, such as technological innovation. Empmcal 
economists such as Max Roser and Jesus Crespo-Cuaresma fmd support in the data that 
international trade is increasing income inequality. They empirically confirm the 
predictions of the Stolper-Samuelsen theorem regarding the effects of international 
trade on the distribution of incomes. Lawrence Katz estimates that trade has only 
accounted for 5-15% of rising income inequality. Robert Lawrence argues that 
technological innovation and automation has meant that low-skilled jobs have been 
replaced by machine labor inwealthiernations, and that wealthier countries no longer 
have significant numbers of low·skilled manufacturing workers that could be affected by 
competition from poor countries. 
Economist Branko Milanovic m1alyzed global income inequality, comparing 1988 and 
2008. His analysis indicated that the global top 1% and the middle classes of the 
emerging economies in China, India, Indonesia, Brazil and Egypt were the main winners 
of globalization during th;:tt time. The inflation adjusted income of the global top 1% . 
increased · approximately 60%, while the middle classe? of the emerging economies 
gained by 70-80%. On the other hand, those in the middle class of the developed world 
experienced little real income gains.). 
2.3.7 Gender income inequality 
A look into the gender gap in median earnings of full-time employees according to the 
OECD 2015 found that in many countries, there is a Gender pay gap in favor of males in 
the labor market. Several factors other than discrimination may contribute to this gap. 
On average, women are more likely than men to consider factors other than pay when 
looking for work, and may be less willing to travel or relocate. Thomas Sowell, in his 
book Knowledge and Decisions, claims that this difference is due to women not taking 
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jobs due to marriage or pregnancy, but income studies show that that does not explain 
the entire difference. A U.S. Census's report stated that in US once other factors are 
accounted for there is still a difference in earnings between women and men 
Gender inequality and discrimination is argued to cause and perpetuate poverty and 
vulnerability in society as a whole. Gender Equity Indices seek to provide the tools to 
demonstrate this feature of equity. 19th century socialists like Robert Owen, William 
Thompson, Anna Wheeler and August Bebel argued that the economic inequality 
between genders was the leading cause of economic inequality; however Karl Marx and 
Fredrick Engels believed that the in quality between social classes was the larger cause 
of inequality. 
2.3.8 Employment protection 
The effects of employment protection regulation and its reforms can be analyzed in a 
multivariate manner at the macro level, using indicators such as the youth 
unemployment or employment rate or the share of fixed term contracts in different 
country and different points in time as dependent variables and the changes of 
employment regulation as the main explanatory factor. In fact, this has typically been 
done in the studies discussed above. However, this approach does not allow for 
empirical conclusions regarding the consequences of employment protection regulation 
or re-regulation on individual labour market careers. To achieve that, the labour market 
status of individuals needs to be observed over a certain period of time. Hence, 
longitudinal data sets are required or at least cross sectional data that provide reliable 
retrospective information. 
Taking into account individual characteristics and contextual variables as well as 
information on the institutional constellation, most notable regarding the regulation of 
dismissal protection and access to different form of temporary employment allows for 
the analysis of the consequences of being in a fixed term contract at a certain point in 
time. Empirical studies can either compare most similar individuals passing through 
fixed term contracts with those not in a temporary job or analyze individual labor market 
trajectories before and after a reform of employment protection .Taking a classical study 
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as an example, Blanchard and Landier (2002) made a clear point that the introduction of 
fixed term contracts in a highly regulated labour market such as the French one can have 
ambiguous results in practice despite being aimed at reducing notoriously high youth 
unemployment. Using French survey and panel data from 1983 to 2000, they can show 
that the labor market for young labor market entrants was particularly affected. The 
share of fixed term contracts increased heavily whereas young people were less 
employed on a permanent basis, while unemployment remained. Rather constant over 
time. The transition from unemployment to employment became easier in the 1980s, but 
in the 1990s the situation was more difficult for young people so there was no clear 
effect on youth unemployment. In both periods permanent hiring's decreased rates of 
transition from fixed term to permanent contracts fell and more young people remained 
in temporary jobs. 
The 1990 were also characterized by a longer transition period from fixed term to 
permanent 
employment, albeit still a bit shorter than compared to the transition from unemployment 
to pem1anent jobs, and a growing wage gap between fixed term and permanent jobs, 
pointing at the unintended development of a segment of low productivity jobs. 
Complementary to this study, (Berton, Deficient and Pacelli (2011)) use employer 
Employee panel data. The authors can show that in Italy the type of temporary contract 
actually determines the stepping stone potential. They find that temporary jobs can 
improve the chance of transition to permanent jobs compared to being or staying 
unemployed, however, in the Italian context transition periods are rather long and 
exhibit repeated temporary employment spells. Training contracts appear as more 
conducive to a successful transition whereas freelance jobs and heavily subsidized fixed 
term contracts offer little opportunities. The subsequent section is partly based on this 
paper. 
2.4 Summary and Knowledge Gap 
Although many studies have been done to examme European labour market and 
immigration, the issue about the introduction of European single market and its effect on 
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labour market has not been explored. This study investigates the impact that the 
introduction of the European single market has had on the rates of employment among 
the union's member countries. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data Collection and Procedures 
Data for this study is obtained from secondary sources. The main sources are Eurostat 
open data, OECD open data and World Bank open data. These are online data sources 
that collect macroeconomic data from different countries across the world. The data 
collected panel data made up of the rate of unemployment among nine European 
countries before and after entering the European single market. Average level of wages 
was also collected on these countries for use in the analysis. 
3.1 Population and Sampling 
The main varj.able of concern for this study is the trend of employment rates in countries 
that have joined the European Union single market during each of the four expansions of 
the single market since its formation in 1993. The best proxy for the level of 
employment in a country is the rate of unemployment that is obtained through the use of 
the labour survey methods in line with regulation by the International Labour 
Organisation. 
The change in average wages level in the countries' is also checked for presence of a 
significant increase in average wage since the countries under the research joined the 
European Union single market. 
The countries selected for the research are; United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal and Denmark and these are primarily 
chosen due to consistency in data on these countries unemployment rate data. 
3.2 Research Design 
The research design employed seeks to determine the long run trend of the member 
states' unemployment rate since the country joined the single market and compare this to 
a control that shows how the country's unemployment rates would have looked like had 
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the country not joined the single market. In order to do that, we use a recently developed 
methodology, synthetic control methods for causal inference in comparative case 
studies; in short, synthetic counterfactuals, which was developed by Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010, 2012). 
The significance of whether these countries have experienced a significant increase in 
the average level of wages is tested by means oft-tests. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
Analytical Framework 
3.3.1. The synthetic counterfactuals methodology 
This paper empirically investigates whether membership in the EU has generated any 
benefits to t1.e individual member states in terms ofbetter employment and wages. Here 
the .researcher estimated what would have been the levels of unemployment and wages 
now in a given countTy if such country had not become a full-fledged member of the 
European Union. The synthetic control method estimates the effect of a given 
inter.Vention, in tills case, EU membership, by comparing the evolution of 
lmemployrnent as an outcome variable for a country affected by the intervention against 
the evolution of the same aggregate outcome for a synthetic control group. The synthetic 
control method answers the question "what would have been the level of unemployment 
in a given country after the year that it joined the single market if the country had not 
become a full-fledged member of the EU?" 
We answer such questions for our sample selection of countries that joined the European 
Union single market after its formation in 1993. The evolution of the outcome for the 
synthetic control is an estimate of the counterfactual. It shows what the behaviour of the 
outcome variable such as unemployment rate would have been for the affected country if 
the intervention had not taken place. More formally, the estimation of the average effect 





Y\t is the outcome of a treated unit i at time t, 
y cit is country i's outcome at timet had it not been subjected to treatment. In this case, 
had it not become a full-fledged member of the European Union. 
We observe the outcome of the treated country Y\t after the treatment (with t2: T 0 ), but 
do not observe what the outcome of this country would be in the absence of treatment 
(i.e., the counterfactual, y cit , fort 2: To ). Abadie et al. (2010) propose a method to 
identify and estimate the dynamic treatment effect Tit considering the potential outcome 
for the country's iEl under the following general model: 
(2) 
(3) 
aitDit = Tit , where Dit is dummy variable which takes value 1 when the country iEI· is 
exposed to the treatment and zero otherwise. 
Suppose we observe the outcome Yit.where i = 1 is the treated country and i = 2, . . . , N 
+ 1 are the untreated control countries originally from Bower and Turrini (2010) . It 
contains the following non-EU countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
China, Hong Kong, Colombia, South Africa, Indonesia, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, . 
Morocco, Mexico, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, the United States of 
America, Turkey and Uruguay; for each period t, with the intervention on country i = 1 
beginning at time T 0. 
In order to construct a counterfactual, a weighted average of the countries contained in 
the donor pool (with i = 2 ... N + 1, and t < To) is estimated to approximate Ylt (fort < 






For the choice of the optimal set of weights W*; consider in matrix notation: 
X 1 the (K x 1) vector of the treated country 1 's unemployment rate characteristics in the 
pre-treatment period. 
Xc is the (K x N) vector of the unemployment rate characteristics for the control 
countries in the donor pool. 
Vis a (K x K) symmetric and positive semi definite matrix 1, which measures the relative 
importance of the characteristics included in X, the unemployment rate. The optimal 
vector of weights w* solves the following minimization problem: 
(7) 
s.t. wi:::: 0 (fori= 2, . .. , N + 1) and 1 = If=j1 wi 
That. is, w* is selected to minimize the pre-treatment distance between the vector of the 
treated countly characteristics and the vector of the potential synthetic control . 
characteristics. w* is chosen to rn+mmize the mean squared error of pre-treatment 
outcomes. 
The synthetic counterfactual is constructed using the optimal weight w* so that Yl t = 
If=jl wi Yit is an approximate estimation of y cit· The treatment effects are estimated 
as: 
1 A symmetric matrix AESRnxn is called positive semidefinite if / Ax 2:: 0 for all xER", and is called positive 
definite if/ Ax> 0 for all nonzero xER". The set of positive semidefinite matrices is denoted s" ., and the 
set of positive definite matrices is denoted by s" ••. The cones". is a proper cone (i.e., closed, convex, 
pointed, and solid) . If A is positive semidefinite (resp. positive definite), we denote A2:: 0 (resp. A> 0). 
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m *= Ylt- If=~/ w * Yit For all t ~To (8) 
The countries considered in the creation of the donor pool that is used to generate the 
synthetic counterfactuals is made up of OECD countries, 020 members and countries 
closely linked by trade to the European Union but that are not members of the European 
single market. The results reported in this paper are for an intermediary donor pool 
consist a pool of the counties originally from Bower and Turrini (20 1 0). It contains the 
following non-EU countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Hong 
Kong, Colombia, South Africa, Indonesia, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Morocco, 
Mexico, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, the United States of America, 
Turkey and Uruguay. 
The path of the weighted average of untreated countries hence matches or mimics the 
path of the treated country in the absence of treatment. The accuracy of the estimation 
depends on the pre-treatment distance of the synthetic control with respect to the treated 
country. All else equal, a longer pre-treatment period allows for a more accurate 
synthetic control. 
The synthetic counterfactuals method entails two identification assumptions: 
(1) The choice of the pre-treatment characteristics should include variables that can 
approximate the path of the treated country, but should not include variables that 
anticipate the effects of the intervention 
(2) The countries used to obtain the synthetic control must not be affected by the 
treatment. 
The first assumption implies that the treatment effects are not anticipated, that is, that 
they start in full at the date assigned for the treatment. Here, the absence of anticipation 
effects means that the growth effects of EU membership are to be observed only after 
each candidate country effectively becomes a full-fledged member. If agents form 
expectations that anticipate these effects the synthetic counterfactual method will 
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generate a lower-bound estimate of the true effect because part of it occurs before the 
start of the treatment which in this case is EU accession. 
The second assumption requires that countries we selected to generate the synthetic 
control group should not be affected by the treatment. Although this assumption clearly 
holds when one defines the treatment as "full-fledged EU membership," it must be 
recognized that integration is a continuum and not a dummy variable. 
The synthetic control ilpproach represents an extension of the differences-in-differences 
framework by allowing the effects on unobserved variables on the outcome to vary over 
time. This is similar to the policy-experiment approach discussed among others by 
Henry (2007). It also allows researchers to perform inferential exercises about the effects 
of the event or intervention of interest that are valid regardless of the number of 
available comparison units, the number of available time periods, and whether aggregate 
or individual data are used for the analysis (Abadie et al., 2010). This method addresses 
endogeneity and omitted variable concerns but has as its main drawback the fact that it 
does not allow assessing the significance of the results using standard large-sample 
inferential techniques, because the number of observations in the control pool and the 
number of periods covered by the sample are usually quite small in comparative case 
studies (Billmeier and Nannicini, 2013). 
The average level of wages of the countries is tested for any significant change since the 
country in question joined the European Union single market. The choice of method to 
use is the t-test. 
The test is chosen here instead of the synthetic counterfactual methodology due to the 
lack of longer dated average wages information needed for use when applying the 
synthetic counterfactual methodology. 
The t-tests are obtained by testing of the hypothesis: 
H0 there is no significant increase in the average level of wages since the country ll11der 
observation joined the EU single market 
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HA there is a significant increase in the average level of wages since the country under 
observation joined the EU single market. 




4.1 Unemployment Rate Synthetic counterlactuals: Baseline results 
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The baseline synthetic counterfactual results using the methodology and data discussed 
above are presented in Figures 1 to 9. There are two series plotted in each. The series 
represented by the continuous line shows the actual unemployment rate of the country in 
question, while the series represented by a dashed line shows the estimated synthetic 
counterfactual. 
4.2 Wages t-test: Baseline results 
The average level of wages used are in US dollars. 
Country hypothesised mean Mean Standard deviation Pr(T>t) 
Belgium 38000 41488.76 1733.805 0.0000 
Denmark 48712 55572.40 5318.465 0.0000 
France ' 31404 35969.92 2980.428 0.0000 
Germany 35289 38298.24 1792.389 0.0000 
Netherlands 45267 47806.00 2473 .695 0.0000 
Luxembourg 51036 59797.76 4910.865 0.0000 
Italy 31463 31606.00 757.872 0.1766 
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-------------------------------
I United Kingdom I 33242 I 41990.32 I son.973 I o.oooo 
The results from the t-tests can be found at the appendix. 
The t-tests on the average level of wages in Portugal were not carried out due to inconsistency 
in the data on wages on the country. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 
Let us consider, as an example, the case of France. Figure 1 shows the evolution of 
unemployment rate in France between 1983 and 2016. France became a full-fledged 
member of the European single market in 1993 and hence this is the year the treatment 
was administered (as shown by the vertical dotted line). Indeed, they show it has been 
lower in every single year since 1994. The actual and the synthetic France series are 
reasonably close and move together before 1993, while they start to diverge in or around 
1993. This indicates there was little anticipation or delay of the effects from EU single 
market membership. Furthermore, the gap between actual and synthetic France seems to 
be constant, suggesting that the benefits from EU membership in this case are more 
likely to be permanent than temporary. The occurrence of the fmancial crisis of 2007-
2009 and its effect to the European banks led to a rise in unemployment rate for France 
and is a trend that is observed across all countries under observation. The graph in 
Figure 1 shows that the effect on the counterfactual would have been less as compared to 
what happened for this same period of 2007-2009 and this is attributed to the increased 
interconnectivity as a result of the single market that caused a contagion effect felt by all 
countries in the union. The counterfactuals shows that this effect on labour would have 
been less in the absence of a single market however the unemployment rate was able to 
recover quicker than the counterfactual and currently indicates that the rate of 
employment is higher currently than it would have been in the absence of a union for 
France. 
The results for Portugal are different, with sizeable and permanent effects for 
unemployment rates. The same negative effect on unemployment rate is seen in 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Italy and Belgium. Overall, these results show 
substantial increases in rates of unemployment for all countries that joined the EU single 
market. The estimates show that for these countries the unemployment rates would have 
been lower if the country had not become an EU single market member. The difference 
between actual units and the synthetic units for these countries seems to diminish over 
time. 
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Some of the figures such as the one for Germany displays that there was a lagged effect 
in that the treated unit and the counterfactual still seem to travel together for a short time 
before divergence begins to occur, this lagged effect is mainly attributed to the effect of 
policy that is not necessarily felt in the same year of treatment due to infrastructural 
requirements and the nature of the implementation systems. The countries that have 
bureaucratical democracies that implement policy on the smallest unit of local 
governance took longer to affect this policy resulting in a lagged effect on the 
unemployment rates. 
The results of France, United Kingdom and Germany show a drop in the rates of 
unemployment since they joined the EU single market in 1993. 
In summary, the synthetic counterfactual methodology seems effective in identifying the 
dividends in terms improvement of labour conditions as a result of EU single market 
membership. Further, they indicate that these dividends are negative and that they often 
tend to be substantial and long lasting in spite ofheterogeneity across countries. 
Specifically, the unemployment rate significantly increases with EU single market 
membership in Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. The 
effects are however seen to be positive for France, United Kingdom and Germany. 
The results obtained from the t-tests run on the average level of wages in these countries 
however, are of the view that all these countries have benefited from an increase the 
level of wages since joining the European single market save for Italy which is shows 
that the increase in the amount of average wages is not significant. Tbe lack ·of 
significant change here is attributable to the deep economic recession that the Italian 
economy has been in since the 2007-2008 Financial crisis. 
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POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
The formation of custom unions is beneficial to the labour situation of a country as demonstrated 
by the significant increases in average wages and hence, countries promote the creation of such. 
I recommend future research into the methods by which the larger economies ofWestern Europe 
such as Germany and France have managed to maintain a lower rate of unemployment as 
compared to the rest of the European single market member states. The results of such a study 
can be used to implement policy that will improve the employment rates in the rest of the 
countries in the European Union ' s single market. 
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APPENDIX 
T -test results obtained are as follows: 
Belgium 
. ttest var1 == 38000 
One-sample f tes t 
Variable Obs 
varl 25 
mean = mean(var1) 
Ho : mean = 38000 
Ha : mean < 38000 
Pr( T < t) = 1. 0000 
Denmark 
. ttest var1 ~= 48712 
One- sample t test 
Variable Obs 
var1 25 
mean = mean(var1) 
Ho : mean = 487 12 
Ha : mean < 48712 
Pr( T < t) = 1.0000 
Mean Std . Err . Std . Dev. [95% Conf. Interval ] 
41488 .76 346 .761 1733 .805 40773 .08 42204 .44 
t = 10 .0610 
degrees of freedom = 24 
Ha: mean != 38000 
Pr( JTI > It !) = 0.0000 
Ha: mean > 38 00 0 
Pr (T > t) = 0.0000 
Mean Std . Err. Std . Dev . [95% Conf. Interval ] 
55572.4 1063 . 693 5318.465 53377.05 57767.75 
t = 6.4496 
degrees of freedom = 24 
Ha : mean != 48712 
Pr( iTI >\ lt l ) = 0. 0000 
so 
Ha: mean > 48 712 
Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
France 
. ttest var1 == 31404 




Ho: mean = 31404 
Ha: mean < 31404 
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 
Germany 
ttest var1 == 35289 




Ho: mean = 35289 
Ha: mean < 35289 
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 
Italy 
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
35969.92 596.0856 2980.428 34739.66 37200.18 
t = 7.6598 
degrees of freedom = 24 
Ha: mean != 31404 
Pr(ITI > It!) = 0.0000 
Ha: mean > 31404 
Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
38298.24 " 358.4777 1792.389 37558.38 39038.1 
t = 8.3945 
degrees of freedom = 24 
Ha: mean != 35289 
Pr(ITI > ltl) = 0.0000 
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Ha: mean > 35289 
Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
. ttest var1 == 31463 
One-sample t test 
Variable Obs 
var1 25 
mean = mean(var1) 
Ho: mean = 31463 
Ha: mean < 31463 
Pr(T < t) = 0. 8234 
Netherlands 
. ttest varl == 45267 
One-sample t test 
Variable Obs 
varl 25 
mean = mean(varl) 
Ho: mean = 45267 
Ha: mean < 45267 
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 
Luxembourg 
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev . [95% Conf. Interval) 
31606 . 52 151.5744 757.8721 31293.69 31919.35 
t = 0. 9469 
degrees of freedom = 24 
Ha: mean != 31463 
Pr((TI > (t() = 0. 3531 
Ha: mean > 31463 
Pr(T > t) = 0.1766 
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev . [95% Conf. Interval] 
47806 494 .7 389 2473 . 695 46784 . 91 48827.09 
t = 5.1320 
degrees of freedom = 24 
Ha: mean != 45267 
Pr( ITI > ltl) = 0.0000 
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Ha: mean > 45267 
Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
. ttest varl == 51036 
One-sample t test 
Variable Obs 
varl 25 
mean = mean(var1) 
Ho : mean = 51036 
Ha: mean < 51036 
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 
United Kingdom 
. ttest var1 == 33242 
One -sample t test 
Variable Obs 
var1 25 
mean = mean(var1) 
Ho: mean = 33242 
Ha: mean < 33242 
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
59797.76 982 .1731 4910.865 57770 . 65 61824.87 
t = 8.9208 
degrees of freedom = 24 
Ha: mean != 51036 
Pr( ITI > ltl) = 0.0000 
Ha : mean > 51036 
Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
Mean Std . Err . Std. Dev . [95% Conf. Interval] 
41990 . 32 1014 .595 5072 .973 39896.3 44084 . 34 
t = 8.6225 
degrees of freedom = 24 
Ha : mean != 33242 
Pr(ITI > ltl) = 0.0000 
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Ha: mean > 33242 
Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
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